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Law school is more than a professional training ground.1 Our graduates 
play a special and privileged role in the nation’s politics and culture. They 
know—or should know—the language of the law, the vehicle broadly capable 
of moving society from where it is to where it aspires to be, and ideally aimed 
at achieving justice in the case of individuals wronged by the state, a neighbor, 
or simple bad luck. This special role for lawyers adds significance to questions 
of who goes to law school and what law students do after they graduate. 
Law graduates’ career decisions have practical effects on access to justice; for 
example, new lawyers may choose to serve, or not to serve, poor, historically 
subordinated communities.
Decisions about careers also link access to justice to student financing of 
law school. The more law students must borrow to pay for their education, 
the more pressure they are under to pursue higher-paying jobs to manage 
repayment. While empirical evidence of the impact of indebtedness on 
decision-making is scarce, the data we do have suggests that more borrowing 
for law school correlates with a lower likelihood of seeking a career devoted 
to the public interest.2 The correlation makes sense, because public interest 
1. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Reaction: Law Schools, Leadership, and Change, 127 Harv. L. rev. F. 49 (2013) 
(describing the special role that law schools, through the lawyers they train, play in society); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (observing that “universities, and in particular, 
law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders”).
2. Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a Financial Aid Experiment at 
NYU Law School, 1 am. econ. J.: appLied econ. 1, 15 (2009) (finding that law students are 
more likely to pursue public interest jobs after receiving grant aid than after receiving an 
economically equivalent combination of debt and loan forgiveness).
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careers tend to pay less.3 The more students must pay for law school, the more 
likely it is that they will seek more lucrative careers.
Lenders have incentives, too. All else equal, a loan to a law student on 
track to land a well-paid job at an elite law firm is a lower risk than one to a 
student who finds work elsewhere. If possible, rational lenders would charge 
different interest rates to borrowers depending on how risky they are—or at 
least how risky they appear. Varying terms of credit would reinforce incentives 
facing student borrowers, encouraging those with greater debt to pursue 
better-compensated jobs. Preventing such added pressure is one reason that 
federal loan programs charge students a fixed rate regardless of borrower 
characteristics.4 In contrast, consumer lenders historically have more closely 
tied the cost of funds to the riskiness of borrowers. They have also engaged in 
prohibited discrimination, systematically charging higher rates to borrowers 
who are African American, for example.5 Greater involvement of commercial 
lenders in higher education finance thus raises the risk that student borrowers 
will face traditional forms of discrimination, as well as more sophisticated 
forms using borrower characteristics that correlate with attributes rendered 
off-limits by law.
Two potential policy shifts in higher education finance, both of which may 
make law school more costly for students and more profitable for lenders, make 
the issue of lender discrimination more pressing. First, opponents of federal 
subsidization of access to higher education have laid the rhetorical foundation 
for arguments that the government’s role should be limited, reduced, or 
eliminated.6 For example, Congress could impose a limit on the total amount 
that students may borrow from the federal government, forcing students to 
rely on consumer loans for additional amounts. Congress could mandate a 
return to the guaranteed loan program that existed before the financial crisis 
that began in 2008, in which the government both paid commercial lenders 
to extend loans to students and at the same time guaranteed those loans, 
protecting lenders in the event of student default. And Congress could end 
federal lending programs entirely, although the political costs of such a move 
would likely be catastrophically high. The common effect of these policy 
moves is to push borrowers to commercial lenders, who generally offer less 
3. Field, supra note 2, at 2 (noting increasing divergence between public service and private-
sector wages to lawyers).
4. Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 caL. L. rev. 1561, 1564 (2015) 
(setting terms of eligibility for student loans by statute).
5. See, e.g., Press Release 12-8869, Dept. Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with 
Wells Fargo Resulting in More Than $175 Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair 
Lending Claims (July 12, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-
settlement-wells-fargo-resulting-more-175-million-relief [https://perma.cc/C4LP-QSAP].
6. See, e.g., Michael Stratford, With GOP in Control, Private Sector Pushes for Increased Role in Student 
Loans, poLiticopro (Dec. 9, 2016) (quoting bank trade group representative expressing 
desire for greater private sector financial institution involvement in federal student lending)
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favorable terms than federal programs, and who charge interest at variable 
rates.7
Second, as of this writing the Trump administration has proposed ending 
the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program (“PSLF”), which, as its name 
suggests, allows for forgiveness of student loan debts owed by graduates who 
pursue careers in the public interest.8 The Trump administration criticized this 
benefit because it “unfairly” favored some career choices over others.9 If PSLF 
is eliminated, some number of students will make different career choices in 
anticipation of a heavier repayment burden.10 More borrowing increases the 
riskiness of investing in higher education of any sort, including law school.11 
Students who are more risk averse, who may be disproportionately students 
whose life experiences have already shown them the burdens of financial 
insecurity, will respond to this risk shift.12 Because more students than ever 
must borrow to pay for law school, 13 the impact could be significant.14
7. Jonathan D. Glater, Guide to Student Loans, n.Y. times (Nov. 30, 2007), https://archive.
nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics_studentloans.html [https://perma.
cc/LWX7-GV9F]. Another possible outcome is greater use of so-called “income share 
agreements” (“ISAs”), under which investors provide money to a student to help cover 
the cost of higher education in exchange for a share of the student’s income for a period 
of years. These relatively novel contracts have not been the subject of extensive litigation 
or legislation, so it is not clear whether they would be treated as loans. dowse B. (Brad) 
rustin iv, neiL e. GraYson, and KierstY m. deGroote, am. enterprise inst. ctr on 
HiGHer educ. reForm, pricinG witHout discrimination: aLternative student Loan 
pricinG, income-sHare aGreements, and tHe equaL credit opportunitY act 12 (Feb. 
2017), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Pricing-Without-Discrimination.
pdf (hereinafter “Pricing without Discrimination”). This essay will not address the specific 
issues presented by ISAs.
8. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2018).
9. Jonathan D. Glater, Public Service Loan Forgiveness in the Administration’s Crosshairs, educ. Law 
proF BLoG (May 24, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2017/05/
public-service-loan-forgiveness-in-the-administrations-crosshairs-by-jonathan-d-glater.html 
[https://perma.cc/67CE-U3G9]. 
10. Students may already have been deterred given the widely reported difficulty borrowers 
have experienced when trying to take advantage of loan forgiveness after working in jobs 
they believed qualified for the benefit. Ron Lieber, The Public Service Loan Forgiveness Rescue 
Hasn’t Gone Well So Far, n.Y. times (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/
your-money/public-service-loan-forgiveness.html.
11. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, supra note 4, at 1581 (noting that leverage in the 
context of higher education finance worsens the borrower’s downside risk).
12. Id.
13. The share of law students who anticipate borrowing to pay for their legal education has 
increased, and a larger share of the students who expect to borrow, also expect to borrow 
larger amounts. Law scHooL surveY oF student enGaGement, How a decade oF deBt 
cHanGed tHe Law student experience: 2015 annuaL surveY resuLts 10, http://lssse.
indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/LSSSE-Annual-Report-2015-Update-FINAL-
revised-web.pdf.
14. Both in absolute and relative terms. Elsewhere I have noted the risk that reducing public 
support of student decisions to work in the public interest will disproportionately deter 
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This essay focuses on the first policy move, which would push more law 
students to borrow from banks or other consumer lenders and accordingly pay 
interest rates that vary over time and, potentially, with borrower characteristics. 
Part II provides an analysis of the effects of variable pricing of student loans, 
especially for law students, and identifies the undesirable consequences; this 
part extends the analysis of a longer, prior paper critical of so-called “risk-
based” pricing of student loans. Part III presents and attempts to answer the 
question of what current laws may limit lenders’ pricing15 of education loans 
in particular and then steps back to examine how those laws might also limit 
setting terms of other kinds of credit based on criteria related to education, 
such as choice of major or institution attended. The concern animating this 
discussion is that lender practices may have a disparate and negative effect 
on borrowers who are members of groups historically excluded from higher 
education opportunity. The analysis in Part III covers not only laws that may 
be applicable but the contributions of critical race theorists to understanding 
of the effects of judicial interpretation of those laws. Part IV examines potential 
implications for law schools and their students of wider use of nontraditional 
criteria in credit decisions. Part V concludes.
II. Changing rates, changing fates
Varying the price of credit for borrowers serves multiple purposes. First, 
the practice enables the lender to protect its interests more effectively, because 
variable pricing can compensate the lender for making a loan to a higher-risk 
borrower. Second, variable rates can encourage potential borrowers who are 
attentive to interest rates to change their behavior to improve their risk profile 
and reap the resulting benefit of the lower cost of credit. However, in the 
context of higher education in general and law school in particular, lending 
governed by market principles will likely have a number of undesirable effects. 
This part briefly identifies these effects, then turns to the implications for 
access to justice, and finally examines potential consequences for law schools.
A. The Risks of Variable Pricing of Student Loans
Adjusting the price of credit based on borrower characteristics is a common 
practice in consumer lending. This section shows why education is different 
and argues that adjusting the cost of credit based on perceived risk posed 
by the student borrower is unjustified, ineffective, unfair, and inconsistent 
with legislative ideals that drove the federal intervention in higher education 
finance.16 
poorer students from those careers, thus potentially changing the composition of the public 
interest workforce, but more importantly limiting the field of possibilities for students based 
on their financial resources. Those who must borrow more will have fewer choices than those 
who borrow less.
15. To be clear, the “pricing” of student loans here is the interest rate charged to the borrower. 
16. A broader argument, that those pursuing higher education should not be burdened by debt 
as they start their working lives, is also possible. That subject has been addressed in a prior 
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This section first describes the typical justifications for tying price to 
characteristics or conduct and demonstrates why in the context of higher 
education finance those rationales are dubious. The second subsection 
questions whether students faced with different costs of credit would modify 
their behavior in response—whether, in other words, variable pricing of 
student loans could successfully achieve a policy goal. The third traces the 
undesirable effects of variable pricing of student loans, whether students 
modify their behavior or not. The fourth identifies the bad incentives that 
variable pricing of student loans creates, and the last subsection contends that 
adopting variable pricing would be inconsistent with the goals underlying 
federal legislation that established federal student aid programs. 
1. Typical rationales for pricing credit based on risk do not apply.
To the extent that charging different interest rates to different kinds of 
borrowers represents a deliberate policy choice, the proper place to begin 
analysis is by asking what the goals are. In the context of consumer lending 
generally, higher interest rates compensate the lender for the greater level of 
risk that a particular borrower may pose. If the borrower is more likely to 
default because of either the characteristics of the borrower or characteristics 
of the use to which the loan will be put, the lender demands a larger premium. 
For example, a borrower who has previously defaulted on obligations may 
appear more risky to a new lender, as might a borrower who plans to put the 
loan proceeds to work in starting a dubious business like landline telephony. 
Were the lender unable to charge a higher rate to the riskier borrower, the 
lender might well decline to extend credit at all.
This variable, or “risk-based,” pricing may consist of calculating a borrower’s 
cost of credit as a premium above some benchmark rate. Setting interest 
rates in this way creates incentives for borrowers whose choices, rather than 
personal histories, can be changed. A lender may effectively steer a borrower 
toward a business venture that the lender believes to be less rather than more 
risky. Granting lenders this power to discriminate can be justified by faith in 
the wisdom of the lender and in the ability of credit markets more generally 
to evaluate projects. If the lender’s estimate of the net benefit to the lender 
of funding each of two possible projects is correct, then there are advantages 
to permitting lenders to charge borrowers more if they pursue one project 
than if they pursue another. If the lender is wrong—which could result either 
from wrongly estimating the profitability of the loan to the lender or, from the 
societal perspective, from excluding from its calculation the social benefits of 
the project—then the mispriced credit means that a socially desirable project 
may not proceed.
article and will not be pursued here. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, supra note 4, 
at 1584 (contrasting risk of leverage taken on to pursue higher education and debt for other 
purposes).
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Using price differentials to affect behavior is not uncommon. Health 
insurers, for example, may charge higher premiums to people who smoke. 
The higher payment both compensates the insurer for the greater risk of costly 
health care for the smoker and encourages smokers to quit. The premium 
either leads to a desirable change or penalizes the person who resists making 
the change. Charging different prices for different consumers thus serves two 
purposes at once: compensating lenders for greater risk and disincentivizing 
socially costly or undesirable conduct. Whether it achieves these two goals, 
by ensuring appropriate but not excessive or inadequate compensation to the 
lender for risk and by effectively changing consumer behavior, is a different 
question. 
In the context of higher education finance, the premium for risk rationale 
does not apply particularly well. Once upon a time, lenders had good reason 
to charge higher interest rates to student borrowers who were more likely 
to default, because those borrowers offered no collateral and lenders had 
no insurance regime. But today the federal government provides the most 
common type of student loan, which is guaranteed, ultimately by taxpayers. 
All student lenders, including those making “private” student loans that may 
carry variable rates, also enjoy the benefit of exceptional protection against 
nonpayment under the federal Bankruptcy Code.17 Correspondingly, it is less 
clear that risk to the lender justifies varying interest rates based on student 
choices or characteristics.
The argument otherwise percolating in policymaking circles does not rest on 
lender protection but on borrower incentives.18 If borrowers face different costs 
of credit depending on their education choices, they can be guided to those 
that are socially optimal. A higher interest rate might discourage borrowers 
from attending a school with a poor graduation rate or high student loan 
default rate. Higher rates could also deter borrowers from choosing majors 
in subjects associated with higher default rates or lower wages. Conversely, 
students attending an institution with a high graduation rate and low default 
rate might obtain credit at a lower cost. Again, if the lender skillfully sets 
interest rates in accord with the relative usefulness of student choices, then 
variable interest rates should produce more frequent selection of desirable 
options.
However, in the context of education, good reasons exist to worry about 
adoption of market-based assessment of student choices, as I have detailed 
17. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019) (permitting discharge of student loans in bankruptcy 
proceedings only upon showing by the borrower of “undue hardship”). Scholarship on the 
impact of this exceptional treatment of student debt has found that the law is inconsistently 
applied, though it is widely perceived as making discharge extremely difficult. Rafael I. 
Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 
am. BKrtcY. L. J. 179, 183-84 (2009).
18. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 wasH. & Lee L. rev. 527 (2013) 
(arguing for varying interest rates based on, for example, college students’ choice of major).
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elsewhere.19 The focus on financial outcomes excludes consideration of other 
aspects of education, including the potential public benefit of pursuing careers 
such as teaching, which are less well-paid but nevertheless highly valued, and 
the intangible value to the student of pursuing one’s passion. More concretely, 
overall assessments of the economic viability of student choices may miss the 
economic viability of any particular student’s choices. Perhaps we do not need 
large numbers of students to devote themselves to study of epic poetry, but 
we also should not want to discourage the one student who might go on to 
write a Pulitzer-winning epic. Factors other than choice of major or choice of 
educational institution play a role in determining whether any student will be 
successful by any metric, financial or otherwise.
To vary interest rates based on additional characteristics might get us closer 
to properly aligning students with institution and course of study, but it might 
open the door to discriminatory pricing of credit in education and would 
position lenders to make judgments well outside their experience or expertise. 
For example, we certainly want vigorous enforcement of prohibitions against 
varying credit terms on the basis of race and sex, even if data suggests that 
financial success in a particular field correlates with such identity-based 
characteristics. Consider further that even if unlawful consideration of race or 
gender does not infect the extension of credit, a lender might still need to wade 
into assessing the quality of the writing of that student studying classical epic 
poetry to make an educated guess about how successful that student would 
be. The difficulty of the latter task might well increase the likelihood of resort 
to insidious proxies for prohibited characteristics, like race or sex.
The legislative bulwark against discrimination is the subject of Part III. 
This part next turns to a more pragmatic question: Does variable pricing of 
student loans work?
2. Variable pricing of student loans is unlikely  
to change borrower behavior.
Students may pay little attention to interest rates, in part because they are 
unaccustomed to having options and evaluating the terms of credit, in part 
because they may believe that whatever loans cost, higher education is worth 
the burden, and in part because they simply tend not to pay attention to such 
complex financial commitments. This should not surprise: If students were 
entirely swayed by monetary signals of social value, they would respond to 
the wages associated with particular careers and pursue educational pathways 
that lead to the jobs that pay the most. Some do and many do not. Studies 
of the effects of terms of credit on borrower behavior are not conclusive, and 
probably for good reasons. Not every borrower is equally able to evaluate 
such terms. This and other potential barriers to efficacy of interest rates as 
19. See generally Jonathan D. Glater, The Unsupportable Cost of Variable Pricing of Student Loans, 70 wasH. 
& Lee L. rev. 2137 (2013) (arguing against pricing of student loans based on borrower 
choices or characteristics).
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an incentive were explored in more detail in a prior project, but in the years 
since the publication of that article, compelling empirical research that took 
advantage of a natural experiment has offered additional evidence.
Xiaoling Ang and Alexei Alexandrov used a policy change, the reduction in 
price of one type of federal student loan at a subset of educational institutions, 
to study whether borrowers responded by replacing other education loans 
with the newly cheaper loan.20 Their research found that borrowers did not do 
the rational thing and substitute the less expensive loans for more expensive 
ones.21 At one level, the authors note, this is not surprising, because a change 
of sixty basis points—0.6%—is modest, and they suggest that perhaps a larger 
change in interest rates would have had an effect.22 This speculation suggests 
a risk that sending a signal through interest rates poses: Too great a difference 
may discourage pursuit of higher education entirely for those confronting the 
higher rate. The authors conclude that while other forms of intervention in 
education finance, like providing students with more information, may be 
effective, “policies based on free-market theories and consumer choice should 
be evaluated very carefully in this particular market.”23
Though using interest rates to drive student borrowers’ choices may fail to 
have the intended effect, it is likely to have consequences. Students who are 
undeterred by the higher costs of credit associated with a particular choice of 
major, for example, will ipso facto carry a higher debt burden and, presuming the 
student’s choice also correlates with likelihood of lower earnings, may well be 
more likely to run into repayment difficulty than under the current regime. In 
other words, a mechanism intended to reduce default rates by steering students 
toward greater financial security may have the perverse result of driving default 
rates up as borrowers ignore the message that higher rates send. Predictions 
of a higher probability of default associated with particular courses of study 
would become self-fulfilling.24 Worse still, although changing the cost of credit 
may not affect student behavior overall, it is quite plausible that some students 
are more responsive to such signals while others are less so. Raising interest 
rates may discourage students who belong to particular, historically excluded 
groups that are more averse to debt, from pursuing certain courses of study.25 
To the extent that federal student loans are intended to make higher education 
20. Xiaoling Ang & Alexei Alexandrov, Choice Architecture Versus Price: Comparing the Effects of Changes 
in the U.S. Student Loan Market, 14 J. empiricaL LeGaL stud. 762, 763-64 (2017); see also Alexei 
Alexandrov & Dalié Jiménez, Lessons from Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student Loan Market, 11 
Harv. L. & poL’Y rev. 175, 178 (2011) (finding, among other things, that the price elasticity 
of demand for student loans was “not significantly different from zero”).
21. Ang & Alexandrov, supra note 20, at 766.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 768.
24. Glater, Unsupportable Cost, supra note 19, at 2147.
25. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, supra note 4, at 1590.
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more—and equally—accessible to all kinds of students, variable pricing might 
well be counterproductive.
If the signaling effect of a higher or lower interest rate were to succeed, that 
result would be disturbing even if the impact did not vary across the student 
population: Only students who needed to borrow would be subject to having 
their studies, careers, and lives shaped by the policy. Those students with 
greater financial resources could continue to study whatever they wanted, seek 
whatever jobs they wanted, and live free of the obligation to repay student 
debt. Students of color disproportionately have fewer financial resources and 
borrow more, so they would correspondingly be disproportionately affected. 
Overall, because varying of interest rates by choice of major, for example, 
would be only selectively paternalistic, the policy would be regressive, 
reinforcing the preexisting distribution of wealth.26 The next subsection 
develops this criticism more fully.
Even this built-in inequity might not be dispositive were the ability to direct 
students to the most socially desirable careers perfect. But there is no reason 
to believe that whatever entity sets interest rates for loans to students pursuing 
different courses of study or different careers would get it right. Predicting the 
jobs of tomorrow is objectively, positively difficult in our ever more quickly 
evolving economy; deciding which of those future jobs, many of which may 
not exist, are most valuable is objectively, normatively difficult in our ever 
more fractious political and cultural climate. Relative to the value of students’ 
ability to choose their own paths to self-fulfillment, one component of which 
may well be contributing to their community, the effort to steer young people’s 
choices is especially misguided, as well as subject to manipulation to serve 
other purposes—a point to which the essay returns in Part III.
3. Variable pricing of student loans is regressive.
Only students who depend on credit to pay for higher education are 
subject to any incentive created by terms on which that credit is extended. 
Accordingly, the attempt to steer student choices through interest rates 
must have a regressive effect. This is inherent in the policy tool in use, yet it 
is too often ignored, perhaps because the point is so glaringly obvious. But 
if variable pricing of student loans truly aims to direct students into more 
desirable courses of study and ultimately professional development, it is quite 
underinclusive: Students who do not borrow will be immune to the incentive 
effect. From the perspective of efficacy alone, this is no small defect, because 
even though student indebtedness quite rightly dominates national debate 
over accessibility of higher education, most college students still do not use 
federal loans to help pay the cost.27
26. Glater, Unsupportable Cost, supra note 19, at 2156.
27. coLLeGe Board, trends in student aid 2017, at 17 (2017) (fig. 9), https://trends.
collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-student-aid_0.pdf. According to the 
College Board, in 2016-2017, thirty percent of undergraduate students took out federal 
Stafford loans or used parental PLUS loans to help pay for college. Id. Of course, these 
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But efficacy is, or should be, the lesser concern. Equity is the greater one. 
In a higher education finance regime that discourages student choice by 
raising the cost of debt for those of lesser means, students who are better 
off financially will enjoy opportunities unavailable to their classmates. This 
would constitute hostile paternalism, marking students who are already 
socioeconomically disadvantaged as less worthy of freedom of choice. And if 
poorer students ignore the incentives and pursue their desired courses of study 
and employment despite the higher cost of borrowing, they will be penalized 
by higher monthly payments after they graduate or drop out. Indeed, poorer 
student borrowers may be more likely to drop out and more likely to default on 
their repayment obligations as a result of the larger debt burdens that they will 
have. To the extent that predictions about future earning power prove correct, 
students who defy the interest rate incentive and end up in lower-paying jobs 
will be that much more heavily burdened. Variable pricing of student loans 
thus perpetuates and perhaps exacerbates28 preexisting inequality across the 
population of potential college students.
Over time, if variable pricing of students loans were to have the intended 
effect,29 students who depend on credit to pay for higher education would 
end up studying whatever the interest rates encouraged them to study and 
pursuing related careers. Students who do not need to borrow, or at least 
do not need to borrow using federal aid programs, would pursue whatever 
courses of study they liked and would begin their careers unburdened by debt, 
let alone by repayment obligations made higher because of the choices they 
made. Students who do need to borrow would be directed into those jobs 
deemed important by whatever entity or mechanism determined interest rates. 
This tracking phenomenon would ensure greater autonomy for students with 
greater wealth or family income and less for those with less. Even if poorer 
students enjoy higher earnings as a result of responding to an interest rate 
nudge, they may be discouraged from and punished for pursuing careers they 
actually wish to enter. Variable pricing thus perpetuates wider inequality, a 
problem that higher education alone cannot fix but one that policy should not 
exacerbate. This runs very precisely counter to the vision of higher education 
as a socioeconomic equalizer empowering students to make independent 
figures can vary from year to year.
28. This is so because students who borrow are less likely to complete a given course of study. 
Dai Li, Degree Attainment of Undergraduate Student Borrowers in Four-Year Institutions: A Multilevel 
Analysis, 37 J. student Fin. aid 5, 11 (2008), https://publications.nasfaa.org/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1045&context=jsfa. And upon dropping out, indebted students may be materially 
worse off than they were when they started their higher education because they may fail to 
obtain higher-paying employment associated with graduation and because they have the 
obligation to repay their student loans.
29. Which, to be clear, is not likely. If higher wages do not drive student decision-making, it is 
hard to see how interest rate changes would. See supra Part II.A.2.
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choices about their lives, the vision that lawmakers acted upon in approving 
the Higher Education Act30 (the “HEA”) nearly sixty years ago.31
Both the need for credit to pay for higher education and susceptibility to 
the incentive created by variable interest rates almost certainly are unevenly 
distributed across the student population. African American and Latinx 
students are disproportionately poor and so would be disproportionately 
affected by such a policy, either steered into particular courses of study and onto 
particular career paths or penalized for choosing disfavored courses of study 
and disfavored career paths. And students from historically disadvantaged 
racial and ethnic backgrounds may be consistently more likely to respond 
to variable interest rates, which could exacerbate disproportionality either in 
career choice or, worse, likelihood of default.32
4. Variable pricing creates undesirable incentives.
Variable pricing of student loans would reduce student autonomy by 
placing constraints on student choice. But supporters of such constraints will 
see the paternalism lurking within incentives as a desirable feature rather than 
a bug. Student autonomy is not referenced in the HEA, for example, although 
it is implicit in earlier discussions in Congress about predecessor legislation, 
when lawmakers debated whether specific fields of study should receive special 
treatment to encourage students to learn more about those areas and topics 
relevant to national defense.33 Congress did not opt for such a heavy hand.34
But a price signal intended to influence student decisions would have 
pernicious effects well beyond burdening autonomy. First, the signal may be 
misguided, because the setting of terms of credit would reflect past trends. 
Were the federal government to implement variable pricing to steer student 
borrowers to high-income careers, the effort might fail because tomorrow’s 
best-paying jobs will not be those of yesterday. Some of the most lucrative jobs 
of today did not exist in the past. There is a nontrivial risk that students who 
respond to price signals will find themselves ready for lucrative employment 
in an industry that is in decline or even has ceased to exist.35 Coupled with 
the potential disparate impact of selectively higher interest rates on students 
historically excluded from higher education opportunity, this could mean that 
these students would consistently lag behind employment trends; variable 
30. Public Law No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965).
31. See infra Part II.A.5.
32. There is evidence that students of different backgrounds are more or less averse to borrowing, 
suggesting the possibility of varying degrees of sensitivity (price elasticity) to interest rate 
changes. Glater, Unsupportable Cost, supra note 19, at 2176.
33. Glater, Unsupportable Cost, supra note 19, at 2169.
34. Id. In prior work I argued that education enables students to pursue their own life choices 
and federal policy should not constrain them; I will not rehash those arguments here. Id. at 
2177-78.
35. Id. at 2149.
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pricing could thus exacerbate rather than ameliorate gaps between employer 
needs and graduates’ skills.
Complicating any effort to direct student choices is the likelihood that 
in the current economy, fewer and fewer employees remain with a single 
employer, or even in the same industry, for an entire career. Students who 
respond to price signals in choosing what to study and where to work may 
move around. Law school graduates in particular may move around given the 
structure of practice: In their early years, lawyers gain experience working in 
organizations that can provide training. As they learn and develop their skills, 
they become more valuable to a wider range of employers that might not have 
been willing to invest in training but would happily poach the now-ready 
lawyer. At different times in their lives, lawyers may move around to pursue 
more or less lucrative or more or less meaningful employment.36 And lawyers 
move into and out of government service. A lawyer’s career can be long and its 
twists and turns quite unpredictable.
Three more adverse effects have special significance for law schools. First, 
the variable pricing of student loans could well penalize undergraduate majors 
that do not lead immediately to high-paying jobs but do lead to enrollment 
in law school. Law students, according to a recent study of the financial value 
of a law degree, disproportionately have chosen undergraduate majors in, for 
example, “humanities and social sciences and are less likely to have majored 
in STEM37 or business and economics.”38 If these students are paying higher 
interest rates on their loans because of their choice of major, then the policy of 
imposing variable rates will disproportionately burden law school graduates.39 
Second, this problem is exacerbated because law students, like graduate 
and professional school students more generally, graduate with larger debts.40 
Law school, like medical school and business school, is expensive. Charging 
higher interest rates to law students, who default on their loans at a lower 
rate than do undergraduates,41 might have the controversial effect of making 
36. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that law school graduates who may enter private 
practice to pay off their loans may then pursue less well-compensated careers in public 
service. See Field, supra note 2 (finding that law school graduates unencumbered by debt 
were significantly more likely to enter public interest careers).
37. Science, technology, engineering, or mathematics.
38. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LeG. stud. 249, 
263 (2014).
39. And, of course, those who fail to complete their course of study.
40. Susan Dynarski, Why Students with Smallest Debts Have the Larger Problem, n.Y. times, Sept. 1, 
2015, at A3.
41. At the freestanding (i.e., not part of a larger university) law school with the highest rate of 
default on student loans, 4.8% of students had defaulted. Stephanie Francis Ward, Which 
Freestanding Law Schools Had the Highest Loan Default Rates for Fiscal Year 2014?, aBa JournaL, Sept. 
28, 2017, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/which_law_schools_had_highest_
loan_defaults_for_fy_2014 [https://perma.cc/W6QB-FBBU]. In contrast, the overall 
Law School, Debt, and Discrimination 
560 Journal of Legal Education
federal student lending more profitable, but could also discourage college 
graduates from pursuing legal education at all. And if aversion to borrowing 
is unevenly distributed across the college graduate population, then the effect 
may be to deter disproportionately those students who historically have been 
underrepresented in law schools.
Third and most importantly, students who defy the signal sent by higher 
interest rates and choose the major associated with lower earnings, who 
nevertheless enroll in law school, and who then do choose lower-paying 
careers in public service, will be penalized. The higher interest rate and 
ensuing heavier repayment burden thus discourages public service, the very 
thing that law school repayment assistance programs and the federal Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness program seek to encourage.42 If law schools and the 
wider legal community wish to expand access to justice, they should think 
long and hard before adopting a policy that makes the choice to serve those 
with limited or no access to representation more costly.
The challenges to law schools are more than theoretical. As law schools 
continue to raise tuition above $50,000 or more for each of three years of study, 
students confronting variable rates tied to career plans, for example, may 
demand a different mix of classes, asking for more transactional classes and 
classes that purport to make them “practice ready.” The cost of institutional 
loan forgiveness programs will also go up. The cost of attending particular law 
schools associated with lower postgraduate earnings might go up, if that were 
included as a factor in setting the cost of a student loan. And then there is the 
related possibility that lenders other than the federal government tie terms of 
other forms of credit to academic performance. This possibility is addressed 
further in the next section.
5. The goals pursued through variable pricing of education  
loans are inconsistent with the aims of federal  
intervention in higher education finance.
Simply put, the HEA sought to put higher education within reach of 
aspiring students regardless of family wealth or income. Unlike prior federal 
interventions into higher education finance, such as the GI Bill43 and the 
National Defense Education Act,44 the HEA was not a component of a different 
project, like helping veterans readjust to civilian life or defeating the Soviet 
rate of default on student loans in fiscal 2014 was more than twice as high. Id. Professor 
Simkovic and Professor McIntyre also report that for many years, law school borrowers have 
consistently defaulted at a lower rate. Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 38, at 275.
42. Correspondingly, to the extent that law graduates benefit from PSLF as a result of pursuit 
of public interest careers, the greater their debts, the greater the potential cost of loan 
forgiveness to the taxpayer. This is an argument I am loath to make because PSLF is not 
properly criticized or justified on the basis of cost, but higher interest rates as described here 
would raise the cost of the program essentially for no reason.
43. Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (1944).
44. Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (1958).
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Union in a race to the moon.45 The HEA was a broader and perhaps more 
idealistic effort. While it may be a form of social engineering to make higher 
education more widely accessible, the HEA did not aim to affect how students 
used new federal benefits, to direct them to study particular subjects or pursue 
particular careers that were more likely to yield higher salaries. To the contrary, 
from the beginning federal legislation included provisions intended to entice 
college students into low-pay careers, initially in teaching and later in other 
public service-oriented jobs.46 Lawmakers sought to counter the messages sent 
by the market rather than reinforce them. Even when lawmakers have used 
tools of private finance, like debt, to help students pay for higher education, 
they have done so strategically, adding benefits and protections not typically 
available to consumers. For example, those students who plan to pursue a 
career in teaching can receive a federal grant that converts into a loan should 
the recipient change the plan.47
Lenders other than the federal government may try to use education-related 
indicators, like the identity or nature of the institution a student attends or 
that student’s choice of major, to set the terms of credit generally, not just for 
student loans. Some lenders have made no secret of their business plan to 
identify students who are likely to be high earners but who are not rich yet—
the highly desirable “HENRY.”48 Financial institutions like BankMobile use 
sophisticated analysis of borrower characteristics well beyond past repayment 
history, for example, to sell financial services to people who may so far only 
have “thin” credit histories.49 SoFi, which refinances student loans and offers 
personal and home loans, among other products, advises that “additional 
factors, including your financial history, career experience, and monthly 
income vs. expenses” play a role in determining eligibility and terms of 
credit.50 Sofi’s loans are not fixed rate and may differ for different borrowers. 
Thus, decisions students make about their courses of study and their career 
45. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, supra note 4, at 1576.
46. See, e.g., Higher Education Act, Pub. L. 89-329 (1965), §465 (providing for cancellation of 
teachers’ student loans). The benefit was later broadened; see 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2019) 
(requiring the Secretary of Education to “cancel the balance of interest and principal due 
. . . on any eligible Federal Direct Loan not in default” for borrowers who are employed in 
public service and have met other criteria).
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1070g et seq. (2019).
48. Shawn Tully & Joan Caplin, Look Who Pays for the Bailout, Fortune, Oct. 27, 2008, http://
archive.fortune.com/2008/10/24/magazines/fortune/tully_henrys.fortune/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QK5M-MQ3T].
49. Penny Crosman, BankMobile Deploys AI, Alternative Data to Lend to Thin-file Millennials, american 
BanKer, Dec. 20, 2017 (describing use of educational backgrounds of potential borrowers as 
a factor in determining the availability and/or terms of credit), https://www.americanbanker.
com/news/bankmobile-deploys-ai-alternative-data-to-lend-to-fico-poor-students [https://
perma.cc/6S2W-9FVZ].
50. Eligibility Criteria, soFi, https://www.sofi.com/eligibility-criteria/#eligibility-personal 
[https://perma.cc/E368-54Z9] (last visited July 25, 2018).
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ambitions could come to affect not only the cost of the loans they use to 
finance higher education but the cost of the loans they will need later to buy a 
car, a large appliance, a house—or further education.51
The next part turns to the issues created and the laws governing the 
increasingly sophisticated marketing of credit using analysis of borrower 
characteristics related to education, with particular attention to the risk of 
disparate, adverse impact on people of color and members of other historically 
excluded groups.
B. Variable Pricing and the Special Context of Law Schools
The potential adverse effects of variable pricing of student loans are greater 
in the context of law school for at least three reasons. First, law students borrow 
larger amounts than undergraduate students do.52 Second, and relatedly, the 
freedom of law students to make career choices is accordingly more constrained 
by the hard fact of indebtedness, and there is empirical evidence that debt 
does affect students’ career choices.53 And third, greater levels of indebtedness 
and worse loan terms will hamper the ability of law school graduates to serve 
communities that have historically been underserved or denied access to legal 
representation. It is this last concern that should make any policy potentially 
adding to law school graduates’ debt burdens particularly worrisome to the 
wider community.
Concern over the relationship between how law students finance their legal 
education and their subsequent career options and choices is not new. More 
than fifteen years ago, an American Bar Association task force warned that 
“as law school tuitions and the debts of law students have increased, fewer 
law school graduates can afford to take the comparatively low-paying public 
service legal positions . . . that serve the poor.”54 Recognition of the obstacle 
debt places in the way of public service-oriented students has led to expansion 
51. There will also likely be systemic effects if private lenders successfully lure greater numbers 
of low-risk borrowers, like law school graduates, out of federal loan programs, leaving 
behind those who more frequently default. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. The 
result could be higher costs of the federal aid program, potentially exposing taxpayers and/
or causing the government to raise interest rates on student loans.
52. In the 2015-2016 academic year, bachelor’s degree recipients who borrowed owed, on average, 
$28,400 in student loans. trends in student aid 2017, supra note 27, at 20. The average 
indebtedness of law school graduates is higher. u.s. news & worLd report, Best Grad 
Schools 2019, https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/grad-debt-
rankings [https://perma.cc/C92M-4N2S] (showing that average levels of indebtedness at 
different law schools range from a low of $53,237 to a high of $198,962).
53. Field, supra note 2 (observing that “[t]he fact that income-contingent tuition subsidies 
are associated with higher rates of public interest law than are financially equivalent loan 
repayment schemes provides strong evidence of the influence of debt burden on job choice 
in a real world setting”).
54. aBa commission on Loan repaYment and ForGiveness, LiFtinG tHe Burden: Law 
student deBt as a Barrier to puBLic service 14 (2003).
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of loan repayment assistance programs (“LRAPs”) at the law school level55 
and the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, discussed above, at the 
federal level.56 Yet these interventions, taking effect only after students have 
borrowed, come with strings57 and may not be enough to overcome students’ 
aversion to working in a low-pay field under a substantial debt overhang.58
The decisions of indebted graduates are part of a broader mosaic of well-
analyzed barriers to providing access to justice to populations long denied 
representation.59 Yet the impact of federal aid policy on law student decision-
making deserves considerably more study, and analysis of the access gap within 
the civil justice system must include assessment of the role that indebtedness 
plays. If aid policy at the federal and institutional levels discourages graduates 
from embarking on public service, then successful reforms must extend beyond 
better funding for legal aid60 to include more effective and more generous 
subsidies for law students aspiring to be legal aid lawyers. This ancillary effect 
of aid policy in the context of law schools emphasizes the need to make the 
terms of loans more generous rather than less.
III. Challenging discriminatory use of education-related criteria in lending
Whatever the wisdom of tying interest rates on student loans to student 
characteristics and choices, the practice is already used with consumer loans 
in the private sector. Some sophisticated lenders, making “private” loans that 
carry no government guarantee, are using diverse, nontraditional data gathered 
about potential borrowers to identify those likely to be low risk. Some of these 
lenders, financial institutions like SoFi, focus on education-related loans and 
offer to undercut the rates charged by the federal government for students 
55. See American Bar Association, Loan Repayment Assistance Programs (LRAP), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/center-pro-bono/resources/directory_of_law_school_public_
interest_pro_bono_programs/definitions/pi_lrap/ (listing LRAPs at numerous law 
schools) (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
56. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
57. For example, requiring students to work in a public interest job for a minimum of ten years, 
and keeping current on monthly student loan payments throughout that period. 34 C.F.R. 
§685.219(c) (2019). Further, as a practical matter and as of this writing, the federal Education 
Department has been notoriously stingy in providing forgiveness to students who thought 
themselves eligible. Stacy Cowley, 28,000 Public Servants Sought Student Loan Forgiveness. 96 Got It., 
n.Y. times (Sep. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/business/student-loan-
forgiveness.html.
58. See Field, supra note 2, at 19 (describing the relative impact of provision of a grant convertible 
to a loan and an economically equivalent loan eligible for repayment assistance and 
concluding that debt qua debt deters pursuit of public interest careers and concluding 
that law schools seeking to encourage public service provide grants ex ante rather than loan 
forgiveness ex post).
59. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FordHam urB. L. J. 1227, 
1230 (2014) (identifying structural barriers to providing access to justice).
60. Id. at 1229 (describing cuts in funding to legal aid).
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who are in repayment, for example.61 Other lenders take into account the 
educational experiences of potential borrowers as one set of factors among 
many nontraditional criteria considered in deciding whether to extend credit 
and, if so, on what terms.62 In the fast-evolving world of financial technology, 
or “fintech,”63 educational background is just one type of variable that lenders 
use,64 and the applicable antidiscrimination legislative and regulatory regime 
discussed here governs use of other criteria, too. The focus of this essay is on 
lender use of education-related criteria in credit decisions.
Lenders that use nontraditional criteria like educational background are 
exploiting both technology and culture. Technology enables them to analyze 
numerous variables to find and exploit correlations between propensity to repay 
or default on loans, as well as to gather information on potential borrowers 
that might previously have been more difficult to obtain. Culture, in turn, has 
both conditioned student borrowers to share information about themselves 
very readily,65 making the lenders’ data gathering easier, and reinforced the 
idea that terms of student loans should reflect riskiness to the lender. From 
this perspective, when extending credit to pay for an education, the lender 
is making an individual and private investment, rather than an investment in a 
larger community, and is enabling the borrower to purchase a personal and 
private good, rather than to serve the public good.66 The two notions are 
complementary.
When lenders assess the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, there 
is always the possibility that bias, express or implicit,67 may affect decision-
61. Save Thousands on Your Student Loans, soFi, https://www.sofi.com/refinance-student-loan/ 
[https://perma.cc/L8G5-T9PL] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
62. Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 cHi.-
Kent L. rev. 3, 15 (2018) (“Instead of limiting their use of data to information that has 
a reasonably clear relationship with creditworthiness, they are embracing the unclear 
relationships between ‘Big Data’ and creditworthiness.”).
63. Id. at 7.
64. Use of data on potential borrowers may turn any characteristic into a criterion available to 
lenders, from social media activity to online search history to, of course, choice of major. Id. 
at 13. Some so-called data brokers claim to have amassed thousands of data points on each 
and every consumer in the country. Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: 
Separating Consumer ‘Haves’ from ‘Have-Nots,’ 2014 micH. st. L. rev. 1411, 1413 (2014).
65. Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Privacy and Information Sharing, Pew Research Center, Jan. 14, 
2016, https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/privacy-and-information-sharing/ [https://
perma.cc/ND94-DQY7] (describing people’s willingness to share personal information in 
various contexts).
66. Tension over the goal and proper characterization of higher education is endemic in the 
United States generally and in federal policy in this area in particular. See generally David 
Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American Struggle Over Educational Goals, 34 am. educ. 
res. J. 39, 41 (1997) (arguing that the “history of American education has been a tale of 
ambivalent goals and muddled outcomes”).
67. While express or explicit bias takes the form of animus—the self-aware belief that because of 
group membership, an individual deserves to be treated worse than others not members of 
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making. Lenders may deliberately discriminate against borrowers based on 
borrower characteristics, for example by refusing to lend to African American 
applicants. Lenders may decline to lend or charge higher rates to borrowers 
from particular geographic areas that are dominated by African Americans, 
justifying the practice with a rationale that is facially race-neutral. Deliberate 
or intentional discrimination on the basis of the race of an applicant for credit 
is prohibited by law, as will be discussed further below. Policies or practices 
that do not explicitly consider a protected characteristic, such as race, but that 
still have a consistent, disparate effect on applicants for credit who share that 
protected characteristic, raise more complex issues. These issues persist even 
though technology has been touted as a means to combat discrimination by 
reducing the role of human, subjective, and potentially biased judgment in 
credit decisions.68 Human bias can find its way into algorithms.69
While the preceding Part offered a critique of the practice of tying student 
loan terms to student decisions about courses of study to pursue, institutions 
to attend, and careers to enter, this Part turns to the terms of other kinds of 
consumer loans when lenders consider education, or borrower characteristics 
related to education, as a criterion. The discussion that follows explores 
and analyzes potential limitations of the legal framework that applies to 
discrimination in the extension of credit, with explicit attention to possible 
causes of action against lenders whose practices have the effect of penalizing 
borrowers who are members of groups historically excluded from and currently 
underrepresented in higher education in the United States. This analysis 
identifies the ways in which sophisticated lenders’ assessment of education 
characteristics of potential borrowers could reinforce and perpetuate existing 
disparities in access to credit and socioeconomic inequality more generally.
Lender inclusion of education characteristics in decisions about whether 
and on what terms to extend credit could operate in disparate fashion in 
different ways. If students of color, for example, on average have fewer years of 
schooling and a lender considers years of schooling as an indicator of default 
risk justifying denial or higher pricing of credit, then borrowers of color will 
be disproportionately affected. If students of color disproportionately choose 
particular majors and lenders associate those majors with higher risk of 
default, the same thing may happen. If lenders perceive graduates of certain 
types of institutions, such as for-profit institutions or historically black colleges 
and universities (“HBCUs”), as riskier than graduates of other institutions, 
that subordinated group—“[i]mplicit racial biases refer to the unconscious stereotypes and 
attitudes that we associate with racial groups.” L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit 
Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 126 YaLe L.J. 862, 876 (2017).
68. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 caL. L. rev. 671, 677 
(2016) (warning that although the “very point of data mining is to provide a rational basis 
upon which to distinguish between individuals and to reliably confer to the individual the 
qualities possessed by those who seem statistically similar . . .[,] data mining holds the 
potential to unduly discount members of legally protected classes and to place them at 
systematic relative disadvantage”).
69. Id.
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imposing more costly loan terms would disproportionately affect the students 
of color who disproportionately attend those institutions.70 
To be sure, educational backgrounds of borrowers are just one category of 
characteristics that, if considered in the consumer credit context, could have 
a disparate effect on historically subordinated groups. Some sophisticated 
modern lenders view all personal information as potentially relevant to credit 
decisions.71 Lenders may combine conventional credit history, reflecting past 
borrowing and repayment activity, with a vast and varied assortment of data 
on both online and offline activity in an effort to predict more accurately 
the likelihood of repayment.72 The quantity and nature of data collected on 
consumers using technology has drawn considerable attention and a share of 
critics.73 This “big data” is used by sophisticated marketers and commercial 
entities, including but not limited to lenders, to target customers with 
differentiated products, including credit.74 For example, lenders may develop or 
purchase an algorithm—a mathematical procedure that incorporates different 
variables that reflect consumer behavior or characteristics, such as spending 
habits, location, or, the concern of this essay, educational background—and use 
it to decide what to sell, on what terms, to whom.75 Much of the commentary 
on these practices has focused on the scale and scope of data collection, the 
intrusiveness of collection methods, the risk of inaccuracies that have costly 
effects on consumers,76 and the potential for disparate effects along lines of 
70. This could be done indirectly, too, if a lender were to charge a higher rate or decline to 
extend credit to a borrower who graduated from or attended an institution where the overall 
default rate on students loans was deemed too high. This was the basis of a claim filed by 
one student against Sallie Mae; the case settled. Final Judgment Rodriguez v. Sallie Mae 
(SLM) Corp., No. 3:07-cv-01866-WWE (D. Conn. Oct. 17, 2011).
71. See, e.g., Our Story, ZestFinance, https://internationalfintech.com/Company/zestfinance/ 
(last visited July 12, 2019) (touting the ability to “consume vast amounts of data to more 
accurately identify good borrowers—enabling higher repayment rates for lenders and lower-
cost credit for consumers”).
72. Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YaLe J. L. & tecH. 148, 
157-58 (2016).
73. See, e.g., Schmitz, Secret Consumer, supra note 64, at 1413-15 (describing the collection of vast 
amount of data on consumers and warning of perpetuation of “cycles of poverty” as a result 
of increasingly precise targeting of consumers); see also Edith Ramirez et al., Fed. trade 
comm’n, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability 46-47 (2014), https://www.ftc.
gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-
federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf (describing commercial 
collection and use of data to develop consumer profiles and identifying risk of use or misuse 
of “sensitive” information, such as ethnicity).
74. Schmitz, Secret Consumer, supra note 64, at 1425-26.
75. Algorithms may produce composite “scores,” reflecting these consumer behavior and 
characteristics in summary form to enable commercial entities to try to gauge consumer 
desirability. Id. at 1427 (describing “customized statistical scores that enable customized 
marketing”).
76. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, infra Part III.C., focuses more on this issue of accuracy of 
information, but is less relevant for purposes of the discussion that follows than is the Equal 
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race, class, sex, gender, or other identity characteristics. Less scholarship, 
however, has focused on the specific implications of use of information on 
consumers’ educational background and on the possible protection afforded 
by the existing federal statutory consumer protection framework. The balance 
of this essay contributes to analysis of these two narrower topics.
Data points that a lender might use could have disproportionate effects on 
people who belong to historically subordinated groups, and there is a fast-
growing body of scholarship recognizing and analyzing that risk.77 The focus 
here will remain on lender use of criteria related to education, in part because 
that is most relevant to the potential future experiences of law students and the 
schools they attend and in part because the consequences of using educational 
background as a credit criterion may have effects beyond the individual 
borrower, affecting access to justice.
Although the extension of credit is governed at the federal level by a 
complex network of statutes, consumer lending is less thoroughly and 
consistently regulated than is mortgage lending. Data collection and 
disclosure requirements and prohibitions are different in consumer lending, 
potentially making identification of discriminatory practices in the consumer 
lending context more difficult. This part explores the protections afforded by 
and the limits of the federal78 laws that do reach consumer lending, including 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”),79 the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(“FCRA”),80 and the prohibitions against “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] 
or practice[s]” (known as UDAPs).81 These laws govern consumer credit in 
general rather than student loans in particular.82 It bears emphasizing that 
there almost certainly are possible means of regulating use by lenders of 
borrowers’ educational background under state law, and these means should 
merit futher exploration.
Credit Opportunity Act, infra Part III.A.
77. See, e.g., Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 72, at 152 (warning that use of big data in lending 
decisions could overtake civil rights protections “by using seemingly innocuous information, 
like consumers’ retail preferences, as proxies for sensitive attributes like race”); Christopher 
Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, forthcoming, 19 U.S.c. L. rev. __, 55 (2019) (warning 
of the risk that “use of alternative, education-based data can exacerbate existing credit 
inequalities” even when facially neutral, and developing a proposal for new lender 
underwriting guidelines), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3386205_
code1528821.pdf?abstractid=3349478&mirid=1 and on file with author.
78. This essay will not extend beyond federal laws governing consumer credit. 
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. (2019).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2019).
81. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2019).
82. Private loans still enjoy exceptional treatment under the federal Bankruptcy Code, however. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019) (permitting discharge of student loans, whether federal or 
private, only if a borrower can demonstrate “undue hardship”).
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A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act83
The ECOA flatly prohibits creditors from discriminating against applicants 
for credit “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital 
status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract).”84 Current 
law authorizes the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to 
promulgate regulations to implement this prohibition, as well as other 
provisions of the Act.85 Regulation B gives effect to the prohibition on 
discrimination.86 The rule repeats the statutory ban on discrimination on a 
“prohibited basis,” and also prohibits a creditor from making statements that 
would discourage “on a prohibited basis a reasonable person from making 
or pursuing an application” for credit.87 To discourage discrimination on a 
prohibited basis, Regulation B bars a creditor from “inquir[ing] about the 
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex of an applicant or any other 
person in connection with a credit transaction.”88 Perversely, in the absence 
of data revealing these demographic characteristics of borrowers, recognizing 
problematic patterns is more challenging. Creditors may seek any other 
information, though,89 presumably in an effort to balance the lender’s desire 
to “know as much as possible about a prospective borrower and . . . the 
borrower’s right not to disclose information irrelevant to the credit transaction 
or relevant information that may be used in connection with discrimination on 
a prohibited basis.”90
Identification of lender practices that make explicit use of prohibited 
applicant information is straightforward: If a lender has an express policy 
or practice of denying credit to African American applicants or of charging 
higher interest rates to financially identical applicants who differ only in their 
racial backgrounds, that lender has violated the law. That, however, is not the 
challenge posed by sophisticated techniques used by lenders with increasing 
frequency. The possibility of discrimination by proxy arises if a lender uses 
criteria that are facially neutral but that have a disparate impact on borrowers 
who share a prohibited characteristic. For example, a lender might decline to 
lend in certain ZIP codes associated with predominantly African American 
neighborhoods and justify the decision by identifying a connection between 
default risk and location. Alternatively, a lender might decline to extend credit 
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. (2019).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2019).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1691b (2019).
86. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.1(a) (2019).
87. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.4(b) (2019).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b) (2019). The rule permits a creditor to inquire about this information, 
however, for purposes of “monitor[ing]… compliance” with the ECOA, provided that 
specified disclosures are provided to the applicant. Id. 
89. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(a) (2019).
90. Pricing Without Discrimination, supra note 7, at 4. 
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to or might impose a higher interest rate on a potential borrower who attended 
a particular type of academic institution, and that institution might in turn 
be associated overwhelmingly with students of common racial or ethnic 
background.91
These scenarios may be more likely when lenders use a greater variety 
of data on borrowers than was possible in the past, for at least two reasons. 
First, when lenders look for correlations between likelihood of nonpayment 
and other variables, the correlations they find may track but mask prohibited 
characteristics, such as race. This may be the case even if the lender does not 
affirmatively seek to discriminate. The discriminatory impact results if the 
facially neutral variable that correlates with default risk also correlates with 
race, national origin, color, or sex. The doctrinal challenges posed by this kind 
of correlation are discussed below.
The second reason that use of a wider variety of borrower characteristics in 
assessing creditworthiness may have disparate effects on applicants who share 
a prohibited characteristic is the effect of choosing facially neutral variables 
to consider. Using a neutral characteristic correlated disproportionately with 
a prohibited characteristic will then entrench inequality as surely as prior de 
jure exclusion from opportunity sought to. The lender’s selection of particular 
borrower characteristics to include in the search for correlations with default 
risk would be limited by the universe of types of data collected and almost 
certainly would be affected by assumptions about which of those characteristics 
should be included in any assessment. Again, for example, a lender may believe 
geography is relevant and include that as a variable, although geography 
masks another variable that holds predictive power; that is, geography may 
not be explanatory but may correlate with the variable that is explanatory. At 
a deeper level, the reason that a facially neutral characteristic like where an 
applicant for credit lives or whether an applicant owns a home may be overt 
historical discrimination. Consider a lawsuit brought by black applicants for 
credit who alleged that a bank’s use of criminal history in credit decisions 
violated ECOA because of the disparate impact of the policy along lines of 
91. Sasha Rodriguez made this argument in a lawsuit against Sallie Mae several years ago, 
alleging that the lender discriminated on the basis of race by taking into account the cohort 
default rate at the school a borrower attended: the higher the overall default rate at that 
school, the higher the rate charged to borrowers who attended it, notwithstanding each 
borrower’s risk profile. Rodriguez v. SLM Corp., Mem. Decision on Mot. Dismiss Am. 
Compl., 07-cv-1866 (Mar. 6, 2009), at 3 “Due to Sallie Mae’s determination of rates and 
fees based on the school that the student attends, a student attending a school with a 
high minority population does not have the same rates and fees available as a similarly-
situated Caucasian attending a school with a lower minority population.” Id. at 4. And at 
the aggregate level, the use of institutional default rates constitutes a “fair lending concern,” 
the CFPB found in 2012, because black and Latinx students are several times more likely 
than other students to attend institutions with higher default rates. Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, Fair Lending Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 22 (Dec. 2012), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_fair-lending-report.pdf.
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race.92 Black people disproportionately have criminal records.93 However, 
the trial court concluded that because the bank did not automatically reject 
applicants with criminal histories and because “criminal record is legitimately 
related to its extension of credit,”94 the practice could stand. 
Courts generally have accepted statistical evidence of disparate impact to 
make a prima facie case that ECOA has been violated, then allowed a defendant 
to offer a justification, then permitted the plaintiff to argue that another practice 
could serve the stated goal without causing disparate impact.95 This framework 
tracks doctrine in other contexts involving allegations of discrimination, 
including housing96 and employment97—although the Supreme Court has 
not yet explicitly ruled that plaintiffs suing under the ECOA may rely on the 
same kind of statistical evidence of disparate impact as decisions under the 
Fair Housing Act,98 for example, permit.99 Regardless, plaintiffs in consumer 
lending cases that do not involve home loans face higher barriers than those 
in cases that do because of the difficulty of gathering the data needed to show 
a statistical disparity: The ECOA generally prohibits lenders from inquiring 
about applicants’ race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.100 Without such 
92. A.B. & S. Auto Service, Inc. v. South Shore Bank of Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (N.D. 
Ill. 1997).
93. See, e.g., The Sentencing Project, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons 4 
(June 14, 2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-and-
ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/ (finding that black people are “incarcerated at a rate that is 
5.1 times that of whites”).
94. A.B. & S. Auto Service, Inc. v. South Shore Bank of Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (N.D. 
Ill. 1997) (criminal history was relevant to the bank’s assessment of an applicant’s “judgment 
and character”).
95. See, e.g., Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 
275, 282 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (reviewing recent judicial 
opinions and concluding that “[w]hile the approaches of our sister circuits have varied, 
the most recent decisions have applied a similar three-step burden-shifting approach”). The 
United States Supreme Court reversal is discussed infra note 100. See also Barocas and Selbst, 
supra note 68, at 701 (explaining the legal analysis of disparate impact claims in the context 
of employment discrimination claims).
96. Huntington Branch NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 1988).
97. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009).
98. 42 U.S.C. §3604 et seq. (2019).
99. Winnie Taylor, Proving Racial Discrimination and Monitoring Fair Lending Compliance: The Missing 
Data Problem in Nonmortgage Credit, 31 rev. BanKinG & Fin. L. 199, 200 (2011). However, 
the implication of regulators’ explanation of the availability of disparate impact theory 
suggests that the answer to this question should be yes. Policy Statement on Discrimination 
in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266 (Apr. 15, 1994), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/1994/04/15/94-9214/policy-statement-on-discrimination-in-lending-notice-
department-of-housing-and-urban-development.
100. 12 C.F.R. §202.5(b) (2019). A lender may gather such information “for the purpose of 
conducting a self-test,” id., and the data gathered thereby is “privileged” provided that 
the lender takes “appropriate corrective action” if evidence of a possible ECOA violation 
is discovered. 12 C.F.R. §202.15 (2019). Federal legislation requires collection of data on 
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data, and given the potential complexity of the methods of evaluation that 
lenders may use to assess possible borrowers’ creditworthiness, consumers 
seeking to make a prima facie case of an ECOA violation using statistical 
evidence of potential discrimination face a steep climb.101
When a lender does use a criterion that has a disproportionate, negative 
effect on consumers who share a characteristic covered by the ECOA 
prohibition, that lender may defend its policy or practice as justified by a 
“business necessity.”102 This is how a lender could justify relying on a correlation 
between default risk and a facially neutral characteristic that correlates with a 
prohibited characteristic, and this is where challenges to lenders’ use of facially 
neutral criteria are likely to encounter difficulty. Educational background, 
whether reflecting the individual borrower or the borrower’s institution, may 
be correlated with race, but it is not race itself. The Supreme Court for many 
years has adopted a formalistic focus on explicit use of race as a criterion.103 A 
majority of the Justices object to explicit use of race to classify any individual, 
but not necessarily to use of criteria that may serve, intentionally or not, as 
proxies for race.104
Because lenders adopting nontraditional criteria to assess potential 
borrowers can assert that they are drawing on insights about creditworthiness 
produced by analysis of a wide range of personal data, they will be well-
positioned to argue that deployment of whatever criteria they use is supported 
by analysis. For example, taking into account choice of major—even if that 
major highly correlates with race—in setting a borrower’s interest rate could 
well be supported by a finding that a particular major correlates with a higher 
or lower likelihood of default. It may be that individual decision-makers 
within the lender organization harbor explicit racial bias, but bias is not 
otherwise prohibited borrower characteristics in the context of small business lending. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).
101. Taylor, supra note 99, at 206; see also Schmitz, Secret Consumer, supra note 64, at 1445 (describing 
criticism of ECOA as “largely ineffective in addressing the subtle discrimination that occurs 
with respect to lending and credit scoring”).
102. Tex. Dept. Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2517 (2015). The courts have adopted this framework in other cases involving different 
antidiscrimination laws; this case involved the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq.
103. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race 
Equality Cases, 120 YaLe L. J. 1278, 1291-92 (2011) (describing the Court’s move over time 
to adopt the view that the “presumption against racial classifications impugned the 
constitutional validity of benign, race-conscious efforts to integrate”).
104. Developing such proxies using publicly available information may not present great difficulty, 
were a lender to try to do so. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau undertook the 
task itself a few years ago in an effort to find cases of unfair lending practices despite the 
prohibition on lenders’ collection of data on prohibited characteristics. Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, Using Publicly Available Information to Proxy for Unidentified Race and Ethnicity: A 
Methodology and Assessment (2014), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_report_
proxy-methodology.pdf (describing research project to use surname- and geography-based 
information to produce a proxy for race and ethnicity).
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necessary, and finding evidence of bias would certainly be very difficult for any 
plaintiff.105 And of course it may also be that decisions are driven by data: A 
lender might well insist that an automated process uncovered the correlation 
in the process of sifting through reams of data to identify novel indicators 
of default risk.106 Indeed, a lender might not even know the criteria used by 
an artificial intelligence, designed to search for patterns in a great mass of 
data, or how it weighed them in reaching a conclusion about the appropriate 
terms of credit.107 It may be necessary to reverse-engineer the credit analysis, 
if possible, to determine what applicant characteristics played a role. It is not 
impermissible for a lender to make decisions based on factors like cost and 
profitability,108 both of which naturally could be affected by borrower default 
rates.
To overcome this business necessity defense, an applicant for credit or a 
borrower may allege that the lender has alternative methods to achieve the 
same business objective.109 A search found few cases in which a court evaluated 
an ECOA plaintiff’s proffered less discriminatory alternative. 110 Looking 
105. Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 n.c. L. rev. 1071, 1125 (2017) (concluding 
that “because the plaintiff has the burden to prove that illegal discrimination took place 
and the creditor need only present an acceptable motive for an adverse action, defendants 
generally prevail in” ECOA cases).
106. This is a form of machine learning. It is also of course possible to discriminate intentionally 
using sophisticated creditor analysis. See Barocas and Selbst, supra note 68, at 712-13.
107. Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 Harv. J. 
L. & tecH. 889, 907 (2018) (describing artificial intelligence as a “back box” the workings of 
which may be very difficult to discern, even by those using it).
108. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18269 (“When an agency 
finds that a lender’s policy or practice has a disparate impact, the next step is to seek to 
determine whether the policy or practice is justified by a ‘business necessity.’ The justification 
must be manifest and may not be hypothetical or speculative. Factors that may be relevant 
to the justification could include cost and profitability”).
109. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18269 (“a policy or practice 
that has a disparate impact on a prohibited basis . . . still may be found to be discriminatory 
if an alternative policy or practice could serve the same purpose with less discriminatory 
effect”).
110. The Westlaw search encompassed federal district courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme 
Court, using the search terms “Equal Credit Opportunity Act” or “ECOA” and the 
phrase “less discriminatory.” The search identified just five cases: Coleman v. Gen. Motors 
Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64 (M.D. Tenn. 2004); Diamond Ventures LLC v. Baruah, 
699 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2010); Ramirez v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding Inc., 268 F.R.D. 
627 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Garcia v. Country Wide Fin. Corp., 2008 WL 7842104 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) and Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2005 WL 743213 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). None reached 
evaluation of a plaintiff’s proffered alternative policy to replace that at issue in the case. 
A search encompassing the same courts and searching for either “business necessity” or 
“business objective” along with references to the law produced seventeen cases (some of the 
same as those found in the first search), but in none of the cases did a reviewing court assess 
the offered business justification. However, in another recent case in which the jury was 
instructed on the need to evaluate whether a corporate defendant, accused of discrimination 
in violation of the ECOA, could have used a different business practice that had less of a 
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to other discrimination law contexts in which courts use the same burden-
shifting approach, though, is suggestive. It appears that, even when provided 
with a plaintiff’s well-supported, alternative, nondiscriminatory policy or 
practice, courts will not thereupon shift attention back to the defendant but 
will still conduct further assessment of the plaintiff’s proposal. More precisely, 
a judge will very likely follow the steps outlined by the Supreme Court in 
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio and proceed to assess whether a plaintiff’s 
less discriminatory alternative (i) will be “equally effective” in achieving the 
defendant’s stated goal and (ii) will not have the same or a worse, disparate 
impact.111 These considerations complicate any plaintiff’s path to a remedy, 
effectively adding a somewhat vague pair of criteria to the three-part test112 
outlined above.
Consider Hardie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, a case in which the 
plaintiff brought a Civil Rights Act challenge against the NCAA’s practice of 
excluding anyone with a felony conviction from coaching at NCAA-certified 
youth athletic tournaments.113 The defendant justified the rule as protecting 
youthful participants in sporting events.114 The presiding judge concluded 
that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that his proposed alternative policy, 
a slightly less restrictive version of the challenged policy, would result in an 
identical or reduced likelihood of harm to participants in sporting events.115 
The successful plaintiff, this case suggests, would have to offer strong 
statistical evidence of the effect of a proposed alternative policy—evidence 
likely to lead to dueling experts—as well as a compelling argument that the 
fix would still achieve a defendant’s stated goal, which almost certainly would 
involve somewhat subjective assessments. This is a tall order. Furthermore, 
the Ninth Circuit panel noted in passing that a plaintiff’s alternative policy 
could fail the Supreme Court’s two-part Wards Cove test if it exacerbates the 
discriminatory effect. This means that if a reviewing court concludes that a 
plaintiff’s proposal, for example, makes it easier for all applicants for credit to 
obtain loans but racial disparities persist or worsen simply because more white 
applicants apply, then the judge could reject that alternative proposal.116
discriminatory effect, Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., the court did not require the plaintiffs 
to offer an actual, concrete and specific, “equally effective” alternative. 337 F.Supp. 3d 186, 
200 (2018) (ruling against the defendant’s post-verdict challenge to the jury instruction; the 
defendant argued that the jury should have been instructed that the plaintiff had to specify 
an alternative practice).
111. Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989).
112. I.e., showing of disparate impact, defendant response, plaintiff offer of alternative, but then 
the assessment of the proffered alternative. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
113. Hardie v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assoc., 876 F.3d 312 (2017). The plaintiff alleged that the 
practice violated Title II of the Act, which prohibits racial discrimination in places of public 
accommodation. Id.
114. Id. at 316.
115. Id. at 322.
116. Id. at 320.
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What are the implications, then, of this doctrinal framework for challenges 
to lenders’ use of educational characteristics of applicants for credit? Of course, 
such characteristics are not among those prohibited by the ECOA. Absent 
evidence of intent to use educational criteria to discriminate along lines of 
race, color, national origin, or religion, to support a disparate treatment claim, 
a prima facie case would require evidence of disparate impact. To demonstrate 
illegal disparate impact, the challenger would need data to establish that 
education-related criteria correlated with race, because the statute does 
not recognize education status as a suspect classification. Here, a potential 
claimant would encounter the first significant hurdle: data collection.117 As 
discussed more fully above, lenders not only need not but are forbidden to ask 
about the race, color, national origin, or sex of applicants for credit. This is a 
pragmatic obstacle rather than a doctrinal one.
Even when successful in gathering statistical evidence of disparate 
impact on credit applicants who share a prohibited characteristic, plaintiffs 
challenging use of education-related criteria would confront a lender’s all-
but-certain “business necessity” defense. The sophisticated lender drawing on 
nontraditional borrower characteristics could be expected to show a reviewing 
court that education-related criteria, including institution attended, choice of 
major, repayment norms among students attending the same institution, or 
the amount of education debt taken on all related to and were valid predictors 
of the likelihood of borrower default.118 All but the most quantitatively 
sophisticated plaintiffs, somehow in possession of data that any defendant 
would protect vociferously, would have a difficult time rebutting the argument 
that the facially neutral characteristic, educational background, constituted 
useful information for the lender.119 If the lender does not even know what 
variables an artificial intelligence weighed in reaching a credit recommendation 
or decision, the challenge is even greater.
Even if a challenger were able to access and analyze a lender’s data 
purportedly supporting use of educational background in credit decisions by, 
for example, showing that the order in which criteria are considered affected 
the validity of the correlation with risk of default, there would remain a third 
barrier. Challengers must argue that there is an alternative method that the 
lender could use to assess creditworthiness that would not have the same, or 
more severe, disparate impact. Harder still, a judge could conceivably require 
the plaintiff to develop an alternative algorithm producing a less severe effect, 
117. This is not a new challenge. See, e.g., Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (1980) 
(reviewing court observes that “the effects test based on statistical methodology is apt to be 
quite difficult for a plaintiff” because the “Act specifically proscribes inquiry by the creditor 
into the race, sex or marital status of a credit applicant, except in loans secured by residential 
real estate” and rejects the plaintiff’s evidence of disparate impact).
118. A lender could seek to develop an algorithm that did not have disparate effects on members 
of a protected class, but it might be hard to argue that a lender must take on such a task. And 
to adopt less discriminatory pricing of credit would not address the normative concerns 
about the practice in the context of education. See generally Part II supra. 
119. Bruckner, supra note 62, at 54-55.
575
and then persuade the reviewing court that the alternative algorithm was 
“equally effective” in achieving the lender’s goal in using the prior, challenged 
assessment.120 Given that an assessment of creditworthiness is predictive and 
inherently uncertain, a lender might well argue that the proposed alternative 
would not be as effective, setting up a battle of experts over the strength 
of competing algorithms. Further, the reviewing court could consider the 
costliness of switching evaluation methods in determining whether to order 
the lender to adopt the plaintiff’s alternative methodology.121 
These difficulties suggest that in the absence of regulation122 or legislation, 
perhaps to limit the scope of information lenders may use in deciding whether 
to extend credit and on what terms, or perhaps to eliminate consideration of 
application assessment processes and instead focus instead on credit decision 
outcomes, ECOA-based challenges to use of education-related criteria will 
prove difficult.123 Furthermore, the difficulty of data gathering will hamper 
disclosure of evidence of disparities that could move a court or the court of 
public opinion. In the short term, a relatively modest legislative move, simply 
removing the prohibition on collecting information on borrower race, ethnicity, 
age, sex, national origin, or religious background, would help overcome this 
second obstacle, although at the cost of making it easier for a lender to engage 
in traditional discrimination. In the longer term, a sophisticated, informed, 
and, most important, motivated regulator probably must commit to an 
evaluation of the effects of lender lender practices. At the federal level, such a 
regulator may be a long time coming.124
Critical race analysis of the shortcomings of judicial interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and of legislation ostensibly aimed at combating 
discrimination in various contexts has thoroughly identified the pernicious 
effects of doctrine distinguishing between conduct motivated by intentional 
discrimination and conduct that has a disparate impact.125 By treating disparate 
120. Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989). Of course, Wards Cove was 
not an ECOA case, so it is conceivable that a court could adopt a different standard in this 
context. However, in Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., supra note 110, the judge did not 
require such a high degree of specificity, offering hope to future plaintiffs.
121.  Id. The same possibility alluded to above, supra note 120, applies.
122. Or, potentially, novel enforcement tactics that extend the reach of existing regulation or 
legislation.
123. This analysis is not dissimilar to that reached by Barocas and Selbst, supra note 68, in their 
analysis of use of information gleaned by sophisticated use of data by employers in the 
context of Title VII. They conclude that many uses of data mining may well pass legal 
muster. Id. at 709.
124. Pursuant to the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010), state attorneys general may also enforce provisions of federal 
consumer protection laws, including ECOA. 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2019).
125. See, e.g., Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.u. L. rev. 1779, 1781 (2012) (describing 
the Supreme Court’s shift toward exclusion of “social science to prove discrimination and 
insist[ing] instead on unworkable determinations of individual animus”).
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outcomes as constitutionally actionable when the result of explicitly biased 
decisions by individuals motivated by discriminatory animus, the Supreme 
Court has failed to block discrimination effected through facially neutral 
mechanisms or to overturn decisions that do not appear to be motivated by 
overt bias.126 The Court appears to have accepted government use of facially 
neutral practices and policies even if they have racially identifiable effects. 127
Regulations implementing the ECOA explicitly address the disparate impact 
of creditor practices,128 paving the way for private as well as governmental 
enforcement. In this, the law lacks the shortcomings of constitutional doctrine 
that CRT scholars have identified. However, as a practical matter, the ECOA 
creates barriers for plaintiffs resembling those that the Supreme Court has 
erected in its recent antidiscrimination decisions: The plaintiff with evidence of 
evil intent is far more likely to succeed.129 Plaintiffs alleging ECOA violations 
must obtain statistical evidence that is difficult to come by, more so in the 
context of algorithmic lending decisions informed by artificial intelligence, 
and then must overcome creditor argument that the data and algorithms used 
serve a legitimate business necessity. Thus protected by secrecy and cloaked in 
complexity, lender practices may be practically unassailable, and the disparate 
impact claims under the ECOA consequently may be available in theory 
but not in fact. This is not to make an argument for any particular level of 
enforcement, to be sure, but to note that obstacles to ECOA claims are greater 
than they would be were the path to disparate impact claims an easier one.130
 B. Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices
Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
has the authority to adopt rules prohibiting lender use of UDAPs.131 While 
the prohibition on such acts and practices may at first blush seem potentially 
viable as grounds to challenge lenders’ discriminatory use of applicant 
characteristics like education, the law does not grant the bureau unfettered 
discretion to determine what practices are unfair, deceptive, or abusive. To 
justify a conclusion that a lender practice is unfair, for example, the CFPB must 
conclude that the “act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury 
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and [that] 
. . . such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
126. Reva Siegel, Race Conscious but Race Neutral, 66 aLa. L. rev. 653, 663 (2015).
127. Id. at 683.
128. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.6(a) (2019).
129. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State 
Action, 49 stanFord L. rev. 1111, 1134 (1997).
130. If claims are too easily made, this could conceivably result in waste and a higher cost of 
credit—although history is not replete with examples of such an effect of antidiscrimination 
enforcement. 
131. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2019).
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consumers or to competition.”132 In making this determination, the bureau may 
not rely solely or primarily on considerations of public policy.133 Nonetheless, 
the unfair practice definition may be most relevant for a challenge to a lender’s 
use of complex criteria in assessing applicants for credit.
Dodd-Frank defines “abusive” practices as those involving inadequate or 
deliberately misleading disclosure to consumers, but the term is not more 
precisely defined than that.134 The bureau must find that a practice “materially 
interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition 
of a consumer financial product or service” or takes advantage of applicants’ 
“lack of understanding . . . of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the 
product or service; . . . the inability of the consumer to protect the interests 
of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; 
or . . . the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act 
in the interests of the consumer.”135 These conditions are unlikely to arise in 
the context of lender use of nontraditional borrower criteria—in fact, lenders 
are likely to trumpet their use of these criteria as a means for consumers to 
access credit on more favorable terms than they otherwise would receive. The 
bureau may not be able to curb use of nontraditional criteria using the UDAP 
prohibition.136
When given an opportunity to limit a lender’s plan to use a broad variety 
of applicant data in assessing whether to extend credit, the CFPB declined to 
act,137 likely because the effect of the lender’s strategy was difficult to predict 
ex ante. After all, use of different types of data might indeed result in less 
expensive credit than some applicants might otherwise have received, especially 
those applicants who had “thin” credit histories containing little information 
of the sort typically relied upon by more traditional lenders. The company 
that sought the “no-action” letter, Upstart Network Inc., an “online lending 
132. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2019).
133. 12 U.S.C. §5531(c)(2) (2019).
134. Some industry observers have concluded that the CFPB has deliberately resisted precision to 
retain flexibility in enforcement. See, e.g., Anand S. Raman, CFPB Defines ‘Unfair,’ ‘Deceptive’ and 
‘Abusive’ Practices through Enforcement Activity, sKadden’s 2015 insiGHts—FinanciaL reGuLation 
(Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2015/01/cfpb-defines-unfair-
deceptive-and-abusive-practice (noting that “[w]hile both Congress and industry groups 
have called upon the bureau to clarify the scope and meaning of UDAP through its 
rulemaking authority, the CFPB has declined to do so, choosing instead to rely upon its 
enforcement authority and develop its UDAP doctrine on a case-by-case basis”).
135. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2019).
136. While the Act does not define the term, courts in other contexts have required an element of 
intent when assessing conduct alleged to be deceptive. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980) (finding insider trading on basis of access to information obtained 
without violation of a duty not fraudulent or deceptive within meaning of section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because of the absence of intent to breach such a duty).
137. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No-Action Letter - Upstart Network, Inc. (Sept. 
14, 2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-
letter.pdf.
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platform,” committed to share with the bureau the results of its monitoring of 
lending for purposes of detecting disparate effects.138 The company disclosed 
that it planned to pursue a strategy aimed at serving precisely this population 
of potential borrowers with thin histories, and in Upstart’s application 
to the CFPB, the firm outlined the variables that it would use in assessing 
creditworthiness.139 In the application, the company indicated that it would 
“complement[] . . . traditional underwriting signals with other variables that 
are correlated with financial capacity and repayment propensity.” 140 The 
variables to be considered included “educational information including, but 
not limited to, the school attended and degree obtained, and [the applicant’s] 
current employment….”141 Significantly, Upstart’s credit decisions are “based 
on a mix of all the variables used in Upstart’s underwriting model, but they 
also take into account combinations of these variables.”142 This highlights the 
difficulty of teasing apart how sophisticated lenders’ models work. Consider 
that a lender may base credit decisions on correlations between likelihood of 
repayment and facially neutral applicant characteristics. Those correlations 
would bolster the lender’s argument that basing credit decisions on the 
selected borrower characteristics constituted a “business necessity” if the 
lender were confronted with an ECOA challenge. The method of identifying 
correlations—the algorithm—would likely be proprietary to the lender. Indeed, 
if the lender relies on artificial intelligence for analysis, then the lender might 
not even know either the process or the dispositive variables.
As part of its request to the CFPB, Upstart provided confidential information 
suggesting that its “underwriting methodology has not produced a disparate 
impact on protected classes in violation of ECOA or Regulation B.”143 The 
company also proposed that it would monitor credit decision outcomes for 
“specific applicant groups, including groups defined by race/ethnicity, sex, 
age, income, credit history, educational background, and other non-credit 
based variables.”144 The company pledged to work to market its products to 
138. Request for a No-Action Letter - Upstart Network, Inc., at 1, 12, http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter-request.pdf (last visited July 7, 
2019).
139. Id. at 1 (“Upstart’s underwriting model has the ability to identify differences in risk between 
‘thin File’ applicants.”).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 9. Such data collection is possible, notwithstanding Regulation B’s general prohibition 
on collecting protected borrower characteristics. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
Federal regulations permit a lender to conduct a “self-test” to detect potential disparate 
effects of lending practices. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b)(1) (2019). 
144. Request for a No-Action Letter - Upstart Network, Inc., at 14, http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter-request.pdf (last visited July 7, 
2019)
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consumers regardless of these characteristics, as well145; in an ideal world, the 
results of its monitoring efforts would be made public. However, when the 
chief executive of Upstart testified before Congress in the summer of 2019, 
he did not offer detailed data on the demographics of the lender’s approved 
applicants and rejected applicants.146 Opacity will, of course, get in the way of 
any outsider analysis of potential disparate effects that might enable recourse 
to the provisions of the ECOA.147 Those effects, the results of credit decisions, 
matter most.
C. Fair Credit Reporting Act
Although lenders using nontraditional criteria by definition are drawing 
on data from multiple sources other than or in addition to credit reporting 
agencies, there is an argument that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the 
“FCRA”)148 should apply to them. The FCRA governs collection and provision 
of consumer data for various purposes, including the extension of credit.149 Its 
provisions apply to “consumer reports,” defined as “any written, oral, or other 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing 
on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, 
145. Id.
146. In his testimony, Dave Girourard, the chief executive and co-founder of Upstart, told 
lawmakers that the company had “demonstrated that our AI-driven model doesn’t result 
in unlawful ‘disparate impact’ against protected classes of consumers,” and asserted 
that “Upstart’s model provides higher approval rates and lower interest rates for every 
traditionally underserved demographic.” Testimony of Dave Girouard before the Task Force 
on Financial Technology, United States House Committee on Financial Services, July 25, 
2019, at https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HHRG-116-BA00-
Wstate-GirouardD-20190725.pdf. More detail, beyond assertions about aggregate effects, 
would have provided a better understanding of precisely how Upstart’s technology achieved 
higher approval rates and lower interest rates, as well as what benchmark the company used 
– explaining higher approval rates than what and lower interest rates than what. As some 
critics have warned, artificial intelligence may approve applicants for credit who in the past 
would have been denied, but charge them higher interest rates, and in the process replicate 
racially disparate lending practies. See, e.g., Aryn Bussey, Educational Redlining? The use of education 
data in underwriting could leave HBCU and MSI graduates in the dark, July 24, 2019, at https://
protectborrowers.org/educational-redlining/ (describing how stratification along lines of 
race across educational institutions could lead to perpetuation of stratification along lines of 
race in credit markets, if, for example, lenders accept more students and charge lower rates 
to those attending the most selective institutions, because those institutions enroll fewer 
people from historically excluded groups).
147. Although Upstart Network, Inc., pledged to “shar[e] the results of its fair lending and 
access-to-credit test results with the Bureau,” id., the bureau may be barred from using that 
information against the lender. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-1(a) (2019).
148. 15 U.S.C. §1681 et seq. (2019).
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2019) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer 
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for 
consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and 
equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper 
utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter”).
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general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living….”150 The scope 
of the law is not limited to credit reporting agencies; the FCRA applies to 
“any person which [sic], for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit 
basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or 
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers 
for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.”151 This would 
seem to encompass the sources that a lender applying nontraditional criteria to 
applicants might use. The law prohibits some uses of consumer information, 
barring creditors from using medical information in decisions to extend credit, 
for example.152 It also imposes upon credit reporting agencies the obligation to 
correct errors in the credit assessments they maintain when consumers notify 
them.153 This approach is focused on accuracy of information, not outcomes 
of lender decisions, and is in any event dependent on consumers to review 
the data collected on them. The more variables lenders take into account, the 
more daunting the task the consumer faces to ensure that all those variables are 
accurate, let alone to identify consistent disparities in the terms or availability 
of credit.154
If a greater variety of information on consumers is available from different 
sources for use in credit decisions, the FCRA should apply to this wider pool 
of providers of such information.155 However, some who have analyzed the use 
of nontraditional criteria in lending decisions have warned that companies 
providing “alternative credit-assessment tools” may evade the reach of the 
FCRA by, for example, aggregating data at the household or neighborhood 
level rather than using individual-level data.156 Some companies have argued 
that they operate outside of the scope of the FCRA because they are not 
consumer reporting agencies.157 Some critics of the limitations of the FCRA 
have proposed legislation that would prohibit use of data that correlates with 
prohibited characteristics, such as race.158 Taking that action would require 
political will and would likely face industry objection. It would also raise 
new challenges, because myriad data points that lenders use may correlate 
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2019).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2019).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(g)(2) (2019). This suggests that other information could also be made off-
limits in credit assessments were there the political will to do so.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(f) (2019).
154. See Bruckner, supra note 62, at 55 (“To establish harm with an algorithmic credit report, a 
consumer would have to review the thousands of data points used by the algorithmic lender 
to identify an error….”).
155. Id at 50-51. While bank-affiliated lenders drawing on a constellation of nontraditional 
data points might be subject to the FCRA, direct lenders that gather information about 
applicants and use it themselves may not be. Id.
156. Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 72, at 184.
157. Id. at 187.
158. Id. at 200 n.244.
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with race—there are so many available variables that the sheer number of 
correlations is likely unmanageable. Innovation taking advantage of data 
might be hampered.159 This is not to say that a blanket prohibition is a bad 
idea; in fact, such a far-reaching change in credit decision-making might be 
precisely what is necessary to correct disparities that have persisted for far too 
long, and would be responsive to the critical perspectives discussed above. 
In the absence of a prohibition, though, complete transparency in the credit 
application assessment process would at least enable evaluation of the criteria 
used by lenders, to enable identification of any troubling correlations with 
prohibited applicant or borrower characteristics.
IV. Implications for Law Schools and their Students
Predicting the impact of widespread adoption of more complex and varied 
lender analyses of applicants for credit, whether for student loans or consumer 
loans after students complete (or cease) their studies, presents certain obvious 
difficulties. First and foremost, lenders’ methods remain undisclosed: we do 
not know how choice of major, choice of career, institution type, or any of 
numerous other variables might be weighed in a credit decision. Second, we 
lack data on the results of credit decisions by lenders using such nontraditional 
criteria. As a result, this part does not offer predictions but sketches possibilities.
To the extent that lenders associate education-related variables with a greater 
propensity to default, they may well penalize those who pursue particular 
courses of study associated with lower earnings; who attend colleges, universities 
and law schools associated with lower earnings or higher default rates; and 
who manifest in ways visible to lenders the intention to pursue a career with 
lower earning potential. This pattern would reinforce some preexisting and 
longstanding forms of inequality among student borrowers and likely introduce 
a few new ones. Young people who are already privileged disproportionately 
attend the most elite colleges and universities,160 and presumably the most 
elite law schools. Lenders that offer cheaper credit to students at, or who have 
graduated from, those institutions will disproportionately reach students who 
were already advantaged, reinforcing preexisting inequality along lines of 
socioeconomic status, as well as race. For those who are less advantaged but 
who manage to enroll at an elite institution, the benefits will be real. More 
159. Chris Brummer and Yesha Yadav propose that regulators (and lawmakers) face inevitable 
trade-offs when supervising financial services. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the 
Innovation Trilemma, 107 GeorGetown L. rev. 235, 243 (2018), https://georgetownlawjournal.
org/articles/298/fintech-and-the-innovation-trilemma/pdf. Provision of clear rules and 
maintenance of market integrity may come at the expense of innovation; facilitation of 
innovation may come at the expense of clear rules. Id. at 264. While the authors do not focus 
on the application of the FCRA or the ECOA, the analysis is relevant.
160. Gregor Aisch, Larry Buchanan, Amanda Cox & Kevin Quealy, Some Colleges Have More Students 
From the Top 1 Percent Than the Bottom 60. Find Yours, n.Y. times (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/18/upshot/some-colleges-have-more-students-from-the-
top-1-percent-than-the-bottom-60.html.
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frequently these students will enroll at institutions less favored by prospective 
lenders.161
Turning to student loans, in particular, tying terms or availability to 
perceived postgraduate earnings potential would disproportionately affect 
law students interested in particular career paths, especially those in the public 
interest. The wider spread of this lender tactic would increase the importance 
of loan repayment assistance programs for newly minted lawyers. However, as 
a practical matter there may be little that law schools can do to stop lenders 
from continuing to expand the practice of taking into account a wide variety 
of characteristics of their students or of the institution when they make credit 
decisions. Some of the data that lenders may draw on must be disclosed, either 
because the Education Department requires it or the American Bar Association 
mandates it.
There is one concrete way law schools should prepare for this fast-changing 
lending environment. To assist students effectively, law school financial aid 
advisers should keep abreast of changes in evaluation methods by private 
student loan providers, whose products many students may turn to after they 
exhaust their federal borrowing options. To be able to advise students who may 
lack financial sophistication, financial aid staff should try to educate students 
about how loans are priced and steer them to lower-cost options. And of course, 
the need for financial literacy training for student borrowers is that much 
greater the more sophisticated lenders’ methods become. Students—indeed, 
all consumers—must appreciate that comparison shopping will become ever 
more important the more customized credit offerings become. Unfortunately, 
there is not much evidence that financial literacy efforts work162; this may be an 
area that is ripe for carefully designed intermediaries to help consumers. 
There are broader, systemic implications for student lending if borrowers 
offer private student loans on terms that are, at least at a given point in time, 
more favorable than those of federal student loans. If these lenders’ assessments 
are accurate, they will siphon off low-risk students from the federal loan system 
and leave behind those student borrowers who are more likely to default. Law 
students in particular are relatively low risk, at least as conventionally measured 
using cohort default rates, and they also borrow larger amounts than do 
undergraduate students.163 If such large, low-risk borrowers opt out of federal 
student lending, they also reduce the amount by which federal aid programs 
are revenue-positive.164 Currently, federal student lending takes in more than 
161. Lenders have an incentive to offer students from the same institution the same or very similar 
terms, because such generalized approach reduces the potential legal risk of individualized 
assessment that could result in a disparate impact on the basis of race or another prohibited 
characteristic.
162. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 iowa L. rev. 197, 210-11 (2008-
2009) (finding that “researchers have not empirically validated financial-literacy education’s 
effectiveness as a policy tool”). 
163. Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 38, at 275.
164. I use this term because technically, this is a “negative subsidy” rather than a “profit.” Glenn 
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the government lends out, thanks to interest payments by borrowers,165 and 
high-balance borrowers like law students pay more in interest. If lending to 
students comes to appear more costly to the government and by extension to 
taxpayers, federal student aid will become more politically vulnerable. Thus, 
if sophisticated lenders are successful in identifying low-risk, high-balance 
borrowers and luring them from federal loans, they threaten to undermine 
federal programs both financially and politically.
Of course, there are also risks to borrowers of moving to nonfederal student 
loans, even if initially the interest rates they face are lower. First, rates on private 
loans typically fluctuate. Second, should the borrower encounter repayment 
difficulty, the flexible repayment plans and the option of forbearance provided 
by the Education Department will be unavailable. These differences matter 
because, although the evidence suggests that law students tend to default 
less often than undergraduates on their student loans, some law students do 
experience considerable hardship in repayment and do default, and when they 
do, the balance owed may be considerably larger.166
V. Conclusion
Increasingly sophisticated lenders are taking advantage of the mass of data 
on consumers. Yet some of the data points correlate with characteristics of 
potential borrowers that creditors are prohibited from using in making their 
decisions about whom to lend to and on what terms. Lenders’ choices of 
variables to use in assessing credit applicants may have a disparate impact 
on people who belong to groups historically subordinated both in higher 
education and in the market for consumer credit. This essay has outlined some 
of the reasons that linking either student loan terms or the terms of credit more 
generally to borrower educational characteristics, in particular, poses a threat 
to the accessibility of higher education and undermines the promise that such 
education functions as an engine of socioeconomic mobility. In the context 
Kessler, Elizabeth Warren’s Claim that the U.S. Earns $51 Billion in Profits on Student Loans, wasH. 
post (July 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/elizabeth-
warrens-claim-that-the-us-earns-51-billion-in-profits-on-student-loans/2013/07/10/7769a3c2-
e9b8-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_blog.html?utm_term=.aa1d66af5230. In the public eye the 
distinction is likely meaningless.
165. The point of this observation is not to suggest that federal student aid should “profit,” in the 
words of critics, from extending credit to student borrowers dependent on loans to pursue 
higher education. See, e.g., Letter to Arne Duncan, Sec. of Education, Feb. 25, 2015, http://
www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2015_25_02_Letter_to_Secretary_Duncan_re_
Student_Loan_Profits.pdf (six members of the Senate criticized the “profit” earned by 
the federal government on student lending and called for the Department of Education to 
modify its policies to help indebted students). Rather, the point is larger: The federal role in 
higher education finance will become more politically vulnerable the more it appears to cost.
166. The special obstacles student borrowers face in attempting to discharge education loans in 
bankruptcy proceedings have been well-documented and are beyond the scope of this essay. 
See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge 
Litigation, 83 am. BKrtcY. L.J. 179 (2009) (examining outcomes when student loan borrowers 
sought to discharge obligations in bankruptcy proceedings).
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of legal education, such pricing of credit may disincentivize pursuit of the 
very public service careers that both law schools and the profession seek to 
promote, or—worse—punish those who pursue those careers with less favorable 
loan terms.
Challenges to use of data on credit applicants’ educational backgrounds, 
however, must overcome significant obstacles. The essay has briefly reviewed 
the major federal laws that aim to protect consumers from discrimination on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or religion, in the provision 
of credit, focusing primarily on the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The 
analysis above identified the reasons this and other applicable federal laws 
may require creativity on the part of regulators seeking to challenge disparate 
outcomes resulting from lenders’ use of education-related criteria in assessing 
creditworthiness. Importantly, this essay has not explored possible state 
action to target lender practices that have such effects, and this is a potentially 
fruitful avenue for state regulators to explore. Evidence is difficult to obtain, 
untangling credit evaluation methods will require enormous sophistication, 
and lenders will present a strong defense of business necessity for whatever 
practice they have adopted. The essay has argued for collection of more data 
on lender decision-making and stronger regulatory responses to ever more 
sophisticated lender methods. Failure to recognize and respond to the risks 
these new methods pose will reinforce inequality along lines of race and 
socioeconomic status. Conversely, securing equity of opportunity requires 
vigilance and continuous reform.
